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Abstract
It is by now an established fact, that the so-called high technology industries have experienced growth rates
way above average through most years. High technology industries share of the world manufacturers export
has risen from 12 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1995. More than one-third of Japan's manufacturing
export and more than 40 per cent of America's manufacturing export are products from high technology
industries, and this development has increasingly led to an international obsession with high technology
industries. In a number of countries R&D indicators have by now become the object of intense discussions.
Great efforts are devoted to improve a bad relative standing. 
The aim of this paper is to questioned whether a national specialisation towards high technology industries
is the only way by which the mature, developed countries can hope to sustain and augment their economic
position. I claim that in contrast to much of the assumptions in contemporary politics and in the majority
of the contemporary academic literature on the subject the countries without a specialisation in high
technology industries are not left in the backwaters of economic development. Quite the contrary seems
to be the case as many advanced, high-cost countries experience an above average economic performance
even when specialising in the bottom end of the low-tech industries. 
The argument is illustrated with empirical material from the wooden furniture industry in general - and the
rather successful Danish wooden furniture industry in particular. The possible reasons behind this apparent
paradox are discussed. 
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5The countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,1
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States (OECD, 1992). 
Up till 1987 Instruments and Electrical Machinery where also included in the group of high technology2
industries (OECD, 1992).
1. Introduction
The discrepancies in competitiveness between countries can no longer be seen as the main
outcome of initial differences in resource endowment. The country-based competitive advantages
are created, not inherited (Tyson, 1992). They are build on factors such as divergent national
patterns of demand, and distinct - but basically random - first-mover cost advantages. Also unlike
national industrial specialisation patterns and the development of dissimilar technological capabili-
ties surely play a role (Porter, 1990). 
Of these different sources of national competitiveness only the latter - the technological capabilities
- lend itself rather easily towards improvements through targeted political initiatives. In a period
of intensified international competition it is not surprising that precisely this factor has been
receiving a lot of political attention. The theoretical justification for enhancing a country's
technological capabilities through governmental intervention is found in the recent developments
in endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1990, Grossman & Helpman, 1991 & 1993) and their
treatment of commercially oriented innovation efforts that respond to economic incentives as a
major engine of technological progress and productivity growth (Coe & Helpman, 1993). 
What constitutes the group of technology-intensive or high-tech industries must necessarily be
somewhat arbitrary, but usually they are identified on the basis of the R&D effort (OECD, 1985),
where R&D expenditure per unit of production is interpreted as a measure of the industries level
of technological sophistication. 
The OECD has regularly calculated the R&D intensity ratio for 22 manufacturing sectors and
thirteen countries  which taken together account for more than 95 per cent of the industrial R&D1
performed in the OECD area. For each industry the ratio has been weighted by each country's
share in the total output of the thirteen countries using purchasing power parities to convert to a
common currency. Since 1972 the high-tech industries thus defined have included aerospace,
computers, electronics and pharmaceuticals, each with an R&D expenditure/production above 6
per cent (OECD 1992, 1995 ).2
Such research-intensive industries are characterised by sharp learning curves and a significant
degree of internationalisation of production, enabling them to utilise substantial economics of
scale. It is also an established fact, that these industries have experienced growth rates way above
6For calculating the export specialisation index se Soete (1987) or Dosi, Pavitt & Soete (1990). The high3
and growing Irish specialisation in high technology industries is mainly due to foreign investments from
multinationals in chemicals and electronics (Dalum, 1996). Ireland is the only small European country with
an export specialisation in high technology industries from 1980 to 1990.
The small high income OECD countries usually include Austria, Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland,4
the Nederlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. Norway are, however, often treated separately in such
comparisons as her very large share of oil exports distort the general specialisation pattern (Dalum,
1996:13).
average through a number of years. High technology industries share of the world manufacturers
export has risen from 12 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1995. More than one-third of Japan's
manufacturing export and more than 40 per cent of America's manufacturing export are products
from high technology industries.
This change in trade specialisation in the US and Japan has led to an international obsession with
high technology industries. In an increasing number of countries R&D indicators have by now
become the object of intense discussions and great efforts are devoted to improve a bad relative
standing. 
Nevertheless it might be questioned whether a national specialisation towards high technology
industries is the only way by which the mature, developed countries can hope to sustain and
augment their economic position. 
Take for instance United Kingdom and Italy, both with app. 58 million inhabitants. Through the
last twenty years UK has experienced a distinctly negative trade performance and a decrease in
market shares on the world market from 8.1 per cent in 1970 to 5.8 per cent in 1987. The trade
performance of Italy has on the other hand been decidedly positive in the same period, with a
strengthening in competitiveness and a slight increase in the countries share of the world market
from 5.5 per cent in 1970 to 5.8 per cent in 1987 (Guerrieri, 1991). The GDP per capita in Italy
is now higher than in the UK (20,200 US$ and 17,300 US$ respectively). Nevertheless does the
UK display a degree of export specialisation in high technology industries far higher than Italy and,
indeed, higher than in any other European country except Ireland .3
A closer look on the data farther shows, that only the largest of the developed economies: USA,
Japan and the UK (and Ireland) have in fact an export specialisation in high-tech industries
(Dalum, 1996). The smaller highly developed countries of Europe  follow a very different4
trajectory, specialising on medium and even low-tech industries. 
But in contrast to much of the assumptions in contemporary politics or in the majority of the
academic literature on the subject the countries without a specialisation in high technology
industries are not left in the backwaters of economic development. On the contrary do many
7It must be mentioned, that the European movements of labour across borders are very insignificant and has5
until now only involved a little cross-border commuting, a few workers engaged in temporary jobs in the
construction industry or some workers in the transport sector, and finally a group of bureaucrats. It is
nothing near the expectations when this issue where originally discussed before the signing of the treaty
of Rome. The low mobility is significantly different from the situation in the US. Even on a cross-regional
scale can labour hardly be considered a mobile factor of production in most European countries. 
experience an above average economic performance even when specialising in the bottom end of
the low-tech industries. 
Later in this paper a case is presented to illustrate empirically and theoretically how even a high
cost country can benefit from specialisation in low technology industries. 
First, however, will a few comments be presented on why we apparently find very systematic
differences in technological specialisation patterns between larger and smaller countries regardless
of their economic standing.
2. Gains and risks associated with specialising in high technology industries
All small countries are faced with the same dilemma of openness: They need access to foreign
resources and can only pay their way by exporting commodities or services at an internationally
competitive price. This in turn forces the domestic producers to match or outstrip foreign firms
in competitiveness and the only feasible way to ensure that the domestic firms keep pace with the
best is by eliminating all barriers to trade. Protectionism is simply not a viable option for small
countries. Small countries need to become regions in a broader economic entity with as little loss
of political independence as possibly.
It is not surprising then, that the small developed countries of Europe - Denmark, Sweden,
Norway, the Nederlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland - a long time ago opened their econo-
mies and actively advocated adopting a non-tariff, non-barrier world trade system (Balassa, 1969).
The liberalisation has been an ongoing process beginning with commodities and later encompass-
ing services, capital, knowledge and - to a degree - also labour .5
Once the domestic market for commodities had become sufficient open, a process of industrial
restructuring was set in motion whereby the small countries experienced a further specialisation
in certain groups of products in which they already had some market power. Even without any
major initial advantage the growth in competence and the utilisation of economies of scale enabled
each country to establish an internationally competitive manufacturing industry (Krugman, 1991).
Over time, generations of rounds of investments - based on perceived international developments
in demand and competition - together with embedded knowledge and other sunk costs have
8The empirical evidence of a low price-elasticity is, however, not very solid and might still be questioned.6
One of the shortcomings of focusing exclusively on R&D expenditure in a particular sector are, of course,7
that some industries might do little R&D themselves while simultaneously purchasing as input highly
R&D-intensive intermediate and capital inputs from other sectors domestically or aboard (Klette, 1994).
Se also Zander & Kogut (1995) on this. 
Drèze (1960 (1989)) where the first to forward this "standard goods hypothesis", and Melchior (1995)8
presents new empirical evidence on this, while Fagerberg (1995) use a different approach to address the
same question. One should note, that the specific specialisation of small countries like Austria and Switzer-
land are very different from the specialisation in the Benelux-countries, which again is different from the
Nordic countries. All have by and large a specialisation in natural resource-based products. The specific
products that dominate the Nordic Countries include metal and ore, paper and pulp, fish and wood etc. For
a further discussion on specialisation patterns and divergence/convergence see Dalum (1996).
solidified the once chosen distribution of investments and thus limited the range of possible
avenues, that might be taken in the time to come (Dosi, 1990). 
The restrictions of size have thus gradually channelled the process of specialisation towards
industries with rather stable demands and low price-elasticity . These industries are often medium6
or low-tech, but can, nevertheless, yield high profits. Front-edge high-tech industries are to a high
extent left to the bigger countries, either by choice or by necessity . Theoretical developments in7
the "new trade theory" (Krugman, 1994) support this by stating that countries are likely to
specialise in sectors and commodities, where the domestic market is of particular importance. The
home market for high-tech commodities does seldom play such roles in small countries. 
Furthermore do the modest sizes of the national economy in small economically advanced
countries place tight restrictions on the ability to function as a buffer for supernormal fluctuations
in international demands. For instance has the market price for the most common memory chip
dropped from US$13 in November 1995 to US$9 in January 1996 and is expected to drop to
US$5 at the end of 1996 while the industry is expecting massive losses and cuts in capacity (The
Economist, 23rd of March 1996). No small countries can in the long run cope with committing
a larger part of its resources to industries with such ups and downs.
Sustaining a high technology industry is not only associated with high risks, but also with high
costs, creating distortions in the national capital base. Even a country like Sweden has probably
exhausted its economic ability to participate in the race for developing the next generation of
advanced military air crafts. All leading edge technologies are furthermore highly subsidised by
the necessity of considerable government procurement, noticeable government subventions
(sometimes through massive government-funded research programs) or strong regulatory "infant-
industry" protection (Grupp, 1995). 
Also the limited size of the national knowledge base influence the range of industries in which
small countries might successfully specialise . 8
9Together, these different restrictions all participate in drawing small countries away from any path
leading towards specialisation in high technology industries. The following section will intend to
show, that other trajectories might also be attractive and economically feasible even in sustaining
some of the highest wage-levels in Europe.
3. Development of a low technology industry in high cost environments
   - the case of the wooden furniture industry
The production of wooden furniture (NACE 4670) is a very important industry in the EU(12),
where the approximately sixty five-thousand firms have an annual production of 39 billion ECUs,
an annual growth rate of 4.5 %, and more than 480.000 employed in 1991 (COM-DGIII, 1993).
Out of a total of 85 subsectors the wooden furniture industry thus ranks as number seven in the
EU(12), only surpassed by the industries: car manufacturing (with 1.070.000 employed), telecom-
munications equipment (890.000), tools (810.000), plastic and clothing (both with 790.000
employed) and basic industrial chemicals (490.000). 
The international economic development has furthermore increased the demand for furniture. The
furniture industry (which also includes other less important subsectors than wooden furniture) has
thus experienced an average annual growth rate of 19 per cent in international demand from the
OECD countries for the whole period from 1961 to 1990 (Villumsen & Dalum, 1994), only
surpassed by computers and peripherals (20.4 %). The market for furniture has become interna-
tional. With an annual extra-EU export ratio of 9.2 % (1991) and a EU import penetration of only
6.4 % the wooden furniture industry is, furthermore, not an unimportant contributor to the EU
trade balance. Competition from the United States and Japan is negligible.
Not only is the wooden furniture industry large and economically important, but it also
undoubtedly belongs to the low technology industries (see table 1) according to OECD's recently
proposed classification of high-technology products and industries (OECD, 1995). But regardless
of the low-tech status of the industry do a lot of incremental product innovation take place, just
like in other low-tech sectors such as the clothing industry. 
Recent surveys conclude, that firms supplying the important German market reckons, that as much
as a quarter of their turnover comes from designs which are less than one year old (Mckinsey,
1994, ch.3.4). 
Though a few larger furniture producers attract much media attention (Natuzzi (Santeramo, Italy)
Panda Furniture, (Belgium), Poliform (Brianza, Italy), DMF (Illinois, US), Davis (High Point,
N.Carolina) Shadow Interiors (Indiana, US)), the wooden furniture industry is dominated by small
10
The average German furniture manufacture has 125 employees and only nine German firms has over a9
thousand employees.
and medium sized firms . This size structure is not a peculiar European phenomenon, but is also9
found in the US, where the $19 billion furniture industry (1995) has about 30% of its plants in
North Carolina. Despite numerous attempts to consolidate the US furniture industry, the size
structure remains the same:
Since 1965, some 42 outsiders have invested in furniture making, each with
dreams of teaching the industry's quaint family founders how to make lots of
money through consolidation... But the outsiders apparently learned a lesson
themselves. All 42 have pulled out of the industry. The most recent two, Masco
Corp. and Armstrong World Industries Inc., bailed out last month after
investing hundreds of millions of dollars in some of the industry's biggest-name
companies... For Masco, it was about $600 million poorer: the difference
between the $1.7 billion it invested in 14 home-furnishings companies and the
$1.1 billion sales price... 
  These weren't small players or Johnny-come-latelys. Together, Masco and
Armstrong World controlled nearly 11% of the industry's manufacturing base.
Their return: profit margins that were half or even a quarter of their other
investments... The home-furnishings business is so highly fragmented, cyclical,
labor-intensive and, well, stuck in its ways that profitability just hasn't measured
up to many other industries...
  Thus, while wave after wave of consolidation pumps new profits into
industries ranging from banking to entertainment, furniture seems impervious
to the changes... 
  So, why is the furniture industry so resistant to consolidation? Analysts and
others offer these thoughts: Furniture is an industry of niches... Some 600
companies specialize in products ranging from $20,000 mahogany dining-room
suites to $6 plastic patio chairs... There's minimal patent protection, and, except
for a handful of top names, there's little brand awareness or loyalty... It's also
an easy business to enter. It's tough to gain efficiencies through mass production
(from Gepfert, 1995).
The increased competition between producers has lead to escalated efforts to automate production
processes, and some progress has been made especially in the production and assembly of
rectilinear furniture from coated panel boards (COM-DGIII, 1993). The production of furniture
is, nevertheless, still rather labour intensive and labour productivity and labour unit costs are there-
fore of particular interest to this industry. 
With this in mind it is perhaps somewhat surprising, that the highest export ratio per capita  in all
Europe is found in the parts with some of the highest labour costs: in parts of Germany, Belgium,
11
Only the last two years of the period studied (1991 and 1992) showed a slight reduction. With the period10
1961-1973 as basis (100), the index for the relative unit labour cost in common currency against the other
EU member countries were: 1974-83: 110.6, 1984: 100.8, 1985: 101.7, 1986: 103.7, 1987: 110.5, 1988:
109.9, 1989: 106.4, 1990: 105.2, 1991: 99.2, 1992: 95.9. 
Other producers of more standard type of furniture may, however, sometimes benefit by some sort of good-11
will spillover from the design segment. The use of the concept of Scandinavian design in marketing of low-
and medium- price commodities might be seen as a sign of such spillovers.
Northern Italy and in Denmark. The latter have the largest export ratio per capita, even thought
the development in the relative unit labour cost in common currency against the other EU
member-countries has not been favourable at all (COM 1991) . As much as 20 per cent of the10
export of wooden furniture from EU is produced in Denmark, which has only 1.5 % of EU's
population. 
The export specialisation pattern also revealed a competitiveness of the Danish furniture industry
with a long track record. In the last twenty five years the market share of all Danish produced
commodities from all sectors of industry to all OECD countries has never exceeded 1.3 % (in
1969). But the market share for wooden furniture has always been at least four times higher
(Dalum, 1995). 
This is not in accordance with former theories of national specialisation and international division
of labour, and it might be worthwhile to look into the reasons behind this somewhat extraordinary
position.
4. Danish furniture industry and the factors of competitiveness
The sustainability in industrial competitiveness for the furniture industry of Denmark is not reached
through the use of any outstanding production technic or through the application of superior
technologies. The production processes used in the wooden furniture industry do not in general
distinguish Danish producers from their main foreign competitors, nor are the stocks of machinery
different from what is accessible throughout Europe even though a certain amount of
customisation will always take place when installing larger or more complex machines at a plant.
Danish producers of wooden furniture do not in general possess any specific property right
(patents, registered designs or trade marks etc.) by which they are protected from competition,
even if as much as 10 per cent of the firms do in fact produce up-market, "designed" furniture .11
And the competitiveness can be hardly ascribed to the utilisation of any economics of scale or the
12
A few producers of wooden furniture own (a part of) a local saw-mill, while a few others belong to the12
same enterprise as a producer of boards and semi-finished wooden products. Such integrations are,
however, not creating any obvious advantages for the firms involved, and can perhaps mainly be seen as
acoincident of history.
Hence Eccless' "....somewhat ironic fact that many managers consider internal transactions to be more13
difficult for exchange than external ones, even though vertical integration is pursued for presumed advanta-
ges" (Eccless, 1982 p.28) has no basis whatsoever in the wooden furniture industry. 
Even though paint and lacquer only account for approximately 5 - 6 % of the total production cost of14
wooden furniture, the cost of the entire coating process (smoothing, priming, painting or lacquering,
drying/defueming, polishing etc.) can exceed 50 % of the total production costs, depending on type and
style of furniture (Dam-Johnsen et al., 1995). 
A few independent firms do painting and /or lacquering on a contract basis, but market share are very15
limited. There are also many producers of semifinished furniture parts and of specialised producers of
wooden frames (later to be used in the production of upholstered furniture) who do not usually sell coated
products.
As Collis (1991) puts it: "....core competence must still be defined relative to competitors". 16
This permanence in the size structure indicates a lack of any major economies of scale. 17
Stigler suggested, that the 'extent of the market' determines the degree of vertical integration. Langlois on18
the other hand maintained, that the extent of vertical integration is primarily determined by the rate of
technological progress.
building of large vertical integrated corporations. Few firms have been recorded  to cross the12
borders between the supplying industries and the furniture industry proper - as shown in figure 1
- and no manager in the furniture industry is recorded for expressing any desire to increase the
degree of vertical integration . 13
The wooden furniture industry proper consists, however, of two distinctive and technologically
very different processes - the process of manufacturing the furniture (wood cutting, drilling,
shaping, grinding and assembling) and the process of painting it  - which is nevertheless more14
often than not integrated in the same firm . The main reason for this seems to be that the paints15
or lacquers are often - at least to some degree - customised to the individual plant, its product
range and its paint spraying equipment, thereby making the painting or lacquering process an
important and integrated part of the firms core competence . Also, time and transport costs surely16
play a role: furniture can seldom be packed and transported in any standardised manner.
Yet even though the firms in the wooden furniture industry usually contain both production
processes, they are mostly very small: The average firm has had approximately 35 full time
employees through a quarter of a century, from 1972 and to the present day (see table 2) , in spite17
of the acquisitions that has recently taken place. The furniture industry is perhaps exemplifying the
points made both by Stiegler (1951) and by Langlois (1989) . But whether it is the long term18
growth of the market for wooden furniture or the lack of any rapid technological progress that has
determined the structure, it is a fact, that the Danish wooden furniture industry is precisely as
dominated by small firms as in many other parts of the world.
13
The survey was conducted by the Statistics Denmark (Danmarks Statistik) on the behalf of the EU-Com-19
mission and EUROSTAT. The results will be published in 1996.
In his classical study of interaction in the US industry Macaulay (1963, p.61) once noticed that "...Salesmen20
often know purchasing agents well. The same two individuals may have dealt with each other from five to
25 years. Each has something to give the other. Salesmen have gossip about competitors, shortages and
price increases to give purchasing agents who treat them well". The same goes for the up- and downstream
relations of Danish producers of wooden furniture.
However, that don't prevent some types of furniture from being produced in an increasingly
automated way - for instance the production and assembly of rectilinear furniture from coated
panel boards. Firms producing commodities less suited for automatization often specialise in a
limited range of furniture products for use in bedrooms, lounges, offices, shops, kitchens or
gardens etc. to more or less targeted groups of customers. Many firms function as subcontractors,
and use a small or large proportion of their capacity to produce specialised, finished or
semifinished inputs to other furniture producers - products like cupboard doors, or front pieces
and sides of drawers.
Many of these subcontractor relationships are very deep-rooted and long lasting. In a recent
survey  some 29 per cent of the firms in the Danish wooden furniture industry answered questions19
regarding the average age of their relations to their main customer and to their main supplier. Both
(!) relations turned out to be amazingly stable: they had known their business partner for as long
as 13 years on average . The survey further shoved, that the main customer bought 39 per cent20
of the total output, and that the three main customers (which they had done business with for 11
years on average) bought more than half of the firms total output. An almost similar concentration
was found on the supply side: the firms’ main supplier delivered 23 per cent of its total purchase,
while the three most important suppliers together cowered 38 per cent of the input. As many as
82 per cent of the firms further interacted that they often interacted with their customers in develo-
ping new products, sometimes leading to temporary exchange of personnel, loans of machinery
or expertise or coordinated investments in production equipment. 
Nevertheless, barely half had any sort of written contract or other formal legal framework for this
interaction. This matter of affairs is in full accordance Macaulay's study of the extent to which
litigation was used to settle disputes between firms in the US. He notes that disputes are:
14
Recent developments in the Danish wooden furniture industry has once again shown, that any radical21
expansion in size necessitates hiring of directors with a general management background. 
The unit labour costs in Denmark has always been higher than the EU or OECD average. 22
Of the 369 firms in the Danish wooden furniture industry in 1972, 297 also existed in 1976. Of these 29723
firms 139 were closed before 1992 (= 47 %). 
 "...frequently settled without reference to the contract or potential or actual
legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of legal rights or to threaten to sue
in these negotiations...Or as one businessman put it, 'You can settle any dispute
if you keep the lawyers and accountants out of it. They just do not understand
the give-and-take needed in business'... Law suites for breach of contract appear
to be rare... Even where the parties have a detailed and carefully planned
agreement which indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on
time, often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a solution
when the problem arises as if there never had been any original contract...'If
something come up, you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the
problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever
want to do business again. One doesn't run to lawyers if he wants to stay in
business because one must behave decently" (Macaulay, 1963 p.61).
The transmission of business attitudes from one generation of managers and owners of firms to
the next is secured by new firms being established mainly by the skilled workers of the industry.
These industry-born entrepreneurs seldom have the ability or personal interest to expand the firm
into a larger and more professionally a managed unit. The specific recruitment pattern is, therefore,
further consolidating the industry's size structure . On the other hand it is precisely the upbringing21
in the industry and the careful acquired (often tacit) knowledge of these homespun managers that
has enabled the industry to overcome the problems of poor quality, rejections and higher
manufacturing costs to a higher degree and more consistently than their foreign competitors .22
Nonetheless does the financial vulnerability of small firms and the low level of commercial
managerial competence show in the high degree of closures and in the low survival rate of new
firms when the firm is unexpectedly hit by some bad payer, some change in taste or some other
unforeseen market fluctuation.
The survival rate increases with age and size. But even the group of firms, which have proved their
merits by existing in at least four years with more than five full time employees, have experienced
a closure rate of 47 per cent (Table 3) . Yet, the low entry barriers and the (until now) constant23
supply of entrepreneurs willing to start producing wooden furniture, has some way or other
maintained almost the same number of firms - and certainly the same size structure - from one year
to the next through several decades. 
15
The imports of softwood in 1994 (in mil. cubic metres) was from Sweden 1.3, Finland 0.7, Poland 0.1,24
Norway 0.05, Russia 0.04, and other countries 0.07 (Schultz et al., 1995). 
Like most small and medium size enterprises the Danish producers of wooden furniture have
difficulties in reaching culturally distant markets. The volume of their annual production makes
it impossible, or at least very difficult, to build and maintain an international oriented sales
organisation. Their limited managerial and financial capacity makes it too burdensome to maintain
contacts on formerly important markets during periods of low demand. The resulting export
strategies of "hit-and-run" on different markets, as determined by the exchange rates and the
development in demand, also imply the risk of being unable to un-commit resources sufficiently
fast when the situation changes. Many firms in the Danish wooden furniture industry instead
choose to deliver to large international oriented furniture retailers like IKEA. Others join with
local producers of supplementary commodities and form some sort of temporary or more
permanent combined sales organisation. Hence, a group of firms can at the same time be
competitors on the labour or input market, rivals on some product markets and companions on
others.
The apparent paradox between the structural vulnerability of the wooden furniture industry on the
one hand, and its sustained competitiveness on the other, might be explained by an existence of
an especially favourable domestic resource endowment. Such an environment could include many
highly specialised suppliers of input and investment goods thus permitting the wooden furniture
producers to engage in a close and mutual beneficial exchange of ideas and experiences (Lundwall,
1985). The utilisation of such domestic knowledge creation might then explain their competitive
advantage vis-à-vis producers with a less favourable industrial environment. Unfortunately, a
closer look at the Danish industrial environment does not lend much support to such an
explanation.
The most important input to the wooden furniture industry is softwood, of which more than 85%
is imported (Schultz et al., 1995), primarily from the other Scandinavian countries, but increasingly
also from the former communist countries in Eastern Europe . The effects of the fragmented24
domestic forest's sector are great difficulties for Danish producers of softwood in utilising the
economies of scale available to their foreign competitors. 
The domestic suppliers of wood processing machinery (cutting, shaping, grinding etc.) were
important once, but not anymore. Before the war approximately half the machinery in the furniture
industry was produced in Denmark, but today more than 90% are imported, mainly from Italy and
Germany. The remaining Danish producers of wood processing machinery are all small and
traditional metalworking enterprises who have not yet been able to bridge the technology gab to
the world of electronics, while their global operating competitors for some time have produced
16
The change from traditional used paint to paint or lacquer, where the solids are contained in water, has a25
number of other effects. Typically the production process will have to be changed, as the paint or lacquer
takes longer time to dry before the pieces can be further handled. This might necessitate enlargement of the
drying facilities, which on the other hand no longer need special filters or chimneys to reduce the impact
on the surrounding environment. In order to get the same smooth surface as before the waterbased paints
or lacquer will often have to be applied several times with a grinding process in between. 
computers aided wood processing machinery - some with image processing abilities. The market
share of Danish furniture related machine producers are thus likely to continue to fall.
The same large import penetration applies for the paint spraying machinery, where Italian
producers dominate, even though the largest Scandinavian producers are located in Denmark. 
The paint and lacquer used for wooden furniture are, however, partly produced in Denmark,
though mostly by branch plants of the large multinational producer Akzo Nobel, while other fore-
ign producers are represented with own distributing and service enterprises (Becker, Klinten,
Hesse Ling, Vortle). The increased environmental pressure in recent years on the wooden furniture
industry to reduce its emission of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), has resulted in rapidly
growing demands for new types of paints and lacquers with high content of solids and/or based
on water. The interaction has been intense between the wooden furniture industry and the
producers of paint and lacquer or their local representatives, in order to ensure the same surface
quality (durability, colour, coverage, shine, thickness etc.) as before. Within this specific area, a
process of knowledge creation has often been embarked upon which sometimes is seen to have
made a difference by enhancing the competitiveness of the involved firms . Through a: 25
.."continuing association both parties can benefit from the somewhat idiosyn-
cratic investment of learning to work together" (Eccles, 1981 p.340) 
5. Why is the competitiveness not eroded by imitation? 
The absence of any strong specialised domestic industrial environment to support and supply the
wooden furniture - with the paint and lacquer industry as a possible exception -  might indicate,
that the revealed international competitiveness of the many small producers originates from their
superior ability to create and accumulate knowledge internally because of acumen in the day-to--
day operations in product development, purchasing, production organisation, handling of labour
relations, marketing etc. If the perceived results of the internal processes were continuously
adjusted in interaction with customers, suppliers and other actors in  their business environment,
a sustainable competitiveness might be the result.
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The following leans heavely on Maskell and Malmberg (1995).26
The phenomenon can be illustrated with data on new firm formation in Denmark. Consider a matrix, where27
all the 208 sectors (ISIC69) in manufacturing industry are placed on one axis and the 12 Danish counties
(including the greater Copenhagen area) on the other. Though the majority of the cells of the matrix were
empty, 87 per cent of the new firms established between 1972-92 were found in "occupied cells" e.g. in
the same sector and region as at least one incumbent firm (see Maskell, 1992). 
This raises, though, a new set of questions. Schumpeter ((1911)1934) argued that successful firms
would be followed by an expanding group of competitors which would imitate them and ultimately
"catch up". But the persistent competitiveness of firms in the Danish wooden furniture industry
indicate the existence of strong "isolating mechanisms" (Rumelt, 1984), where even continuous
and painstaking imitative efforts might be made in vain. Following Dierickx & Cool (1989) three
important factors which hamper imitation can be identified . 26
Asset mass efficiency
 is the first, and presumably most significant factors. Firms that have already
a large stock of R&D- or experience-based know-how, a specialised labour-force, and operational
line of machines etc., are often in a better position to make further breakthroughs and add to their
existing stock of knowledge than firms who have a small initial supply of such factors.
Instinctively, the Danish wooden furniture industry seems an unlikely candidate for any general
claim on some firm-specific asset mass efficiency, which provides a continuous advantage.
There might, however, be some important extra-firm, but intra-industry, elements of asset mass
efficiency. In recent years, many have thus forwarded the idea, that spatial agglomeration of
related economic activities does promote firms' competitiveness, by condensing the effects of a
common culture, a specific language, and a set of informal, but essential economic institutions.
Such agglomerations might be defined as
... a set of companies located in a relatively small area; ...the ..... companies
work, either directly or indirectly, for the same end market; ... they share a
series of values and knowledge so important that they define a cultural
environment; ... they are linked to one another by very specific relations in a
complex mix of competition and co-operation (Brusco, 1990).
First, theory predicts and empirical investigations support  the notion that entrepreneurs within27
a given business sector will concentrate in areas, where this sector is already strongly represented.
Here, the potential entrepreneur has learnt the necessary, trade specific qualifications and gained
the needed experiences. In addition, during this period of learning he or she has established the
imperative personal contacts and has become familiar with the local institutions, both of which are
prerequisites in order to secure the process of opening a new business. 
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Like the wood/furniture engineering school in the provincial town of Herning, centrally situated in the28
cluster of wooden furniture manufacturers.
It is partly to overcome such obstacles to exchange of information that new network relations between firms29
seem to be developing at a faster rate than ever before (Axelsson & Easton, 1992).
As Ben-Porath described it: "..continuity of relationships can generate behaviour on the part of shrewd, self-30
seeking, or even unscrupulous individuals that could otherwise be interpreted as foolish or purely altruistic.
Valuable diamonds change hands on the diamond exchange, and the deals are sealed by a handshake."
(Ben-Porath, 1980 p.6)
Second, a geographical agglomeration of firms within a given business sector in a region will make
the region especially suited to meet the specific location requirements of the firms within the
sector. Even assuming that a new firm or an incumbent is completely free in its choice of location,
the optimal location would usually be exactly the region with a proven record of servicing firms
in just that sector: only such a region has had the opportunity to develop the desired capabilities.
These capabilities include the building of specialised educational institutions  or units targeted at28
public financed dissemination of technological information etc. The differences in capabilities
between regions will (by definition) be divulged in discrepancies in the competitiveness of firms
located there, with long term consequences for their competitiveness.
An empirical indication of the strength of these two forces can be obtained by analysing the
development in the wooden furniture industry's locational pattern. As can be learnt from the maps
1 and 2, the wooden furniture industry has experienced a pronounced relocation and agglomera-
tion in the period from 1972 to 1992 - the years of increasing international exposure. 
The most visible agglomerative force are the cost reduction that might be experienced by the
easier access to specialised supply of complementary (Richardson, 1972) products or services:
auditing, finance, transport, repairs, logistics, market research, marketing, data processing or
design. Just as important might be the easy access to supply of raw materials and intermediary
products or machinery and other production equipment. 
The more subtle agglomerative force is associated with learning. Everything else being equal,
interactive collaboration will be less costly and more smooth, the shorter the distance between the
participants . The proximity seems to create an economic system where malfeasance is punished29 30
and trust-relations can be build and utilised in knowledge-creation (Maskell, 1995), just as the
"flow of information can only take place if there exist channels of information through which the
message can pass. Further, a code of information is necessary in order to make the transmission
of messages effective" (Lundwall, 1988 p.354). 
To communicate tacit knowledge will normally require a high degree of mutual trust and
understanding, which in turn is related not only to language but also to shared values and 'culture'.
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Such trust relations are, however, not just something that comes into existence once a firm is
located in proximity with others. Trust has to be build and that takes time. Time compression
diseconomies
 is thus the second important factor hindering competitors readily imitation of estab-
lished successful behaviour. 
A firm can't just plug into the information channels of a local business system like the wooden
furniture industry. Some knowledge can't simply be bought. On the contrary: often is knowledge
exchanged in a very old fashioned, pre-capitalistic way: by barter. Knowledge is exchanged
directly - without the use of money. You simply need to produce knowledge in order to get
knowledge. 
The third safeguard against imitation is the interconnectedness of asset stocks, i.e. the complex
web of linkages between the firms internal resources and the actual or potential resources it has
access to in its surroundings. Collins (1991) underlines, that the specificity of this interconnected-
ness of asset stocks also influences the choice of strategy:
While the external opportunity set is the same for every firm, the additional
resources each must acquire on the factor market to effectively serve a particu-
lar product market will differ, because the vector of resources each possess
(represented by its core competence) is different. Firms acquire primarily
resources from their domestic factor markets. A firm's country of origin will
directly affect its choice of strategy (Collis, 1991)
The differences in choice of strategy to a foreign potential imitator might in itself serve to
discourage any closer investigation into the causes behind the revealed competitiveness. Even
when this is not the case, a foreign competitor might acquire some of the vital components or
ingredients in this entangled web, but will often in practice finds it difficult to duplicate the relevant
elements in toto (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Formal and informal inter-firm resources might even
interact with the formal institutions in the region in the origination of derivatives with profound
influence on the economic development of the region by being "in the air", thus making it almost
impossible to understand, codify, capture and imitate the capabilities causing the firms revealed
comparative advantage. That such Marshallian phenomenons are indeed still very much in
existence can be illustrated in the great disagreements between local, well-informed businesspeople
in for instance the Italian industrial districts, when they try to identify the reason behind the
districts' contemporary success (Harrison, 1992). The same observation has been recorded from
interviews of managers in the Danish wooden furniture industry (Ranis & Bjørn, 1995). Which
elements that are important and which that are not is simply not always obvious for a potential
imitator (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). 
20
And when imitation of a certain set of resources is difficult, firms having access to that set can
benefit over considerable periods of time. Many resources do not wear easily, and will to some
extent be transferable over time: their use leads to their reproduction and their transmission from
one generation to the next. This transferability over time, but not over space, can sometimes make
national differences in competitiveness very long lasting.
6. Conclusion
The main implication of the brief analysis of the Danish wooden furniture industry is that proximity
matter. This is related to the time geography of individuals. Everything else being equal, interac-
tive collaboration will be less costly and more smooth, the shorter the distance between the
participants. A second dimension is related to proximity in a social and cultural sense. To
communicate some types of knowledge will require a high degree of mutual trust and understand-
ing, which in turn is related not only to language, but also to shared values and 'culture'.
The benefits of proximity can be translated into a force of spatial agglomeration in relation to firms
engaged in interactive processes, some of which might involve learning. In such places, knowledge
tends to become embedded, not only in individual skills and in the routines and procedures of
organisations, but indeed in the milieu as such, or rather in the relations that connect different firms
to each other and to the wider institutional context.
The case illustrates, that it might be highly complicated and in reality perhaps even impossible to
transplant all economic characteristics - intrafirm as well as interfirm - successfully from one
environment to another, thereby laying the foundation for the observed durability in otherwise
incomprehensible competitiveness between the countries of Europe.





List of high R&D intensity industries
(Classification ISIC Revision 2)
High Technology
1. Aerospace
2. Computers (incl. office machinery)







9. Non electrical machinery
Medium-low technology 
10. Shipbuilding
11. Rubber and plastic equipment
12. Other transport equipment
13. Stone, clay and glass
14. Non-ferrous metals





20. Textiles and clothing
21. Wood and furniture
22. Food, Beverages
Source: OECD. 1995. Classification of high-technology products and industries. Working Party no. 9, of the Industry
Committee on Industrial Statistics Group of National Experts on Science and Technology Indicators. Paris 12-13
October (Ref.: 023718/ 13799).
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                                    TABLE 2
                  PRODUCTION OF WOODEN FURNITURE IN DENMARK 
     --------------------------------------------------------------------
                           1972    1976    1980    1984    1988    1992
     --------------------------------------------------------------------
     ESTABLISHMENTS         369     369     339     370     387     357
     EMPLOYED             12528   11790   10745   13122   13214   14041
     TURNOVER (mil.92kr)   5257    5338    4852    7041    8008    9945
     SALES    (mil.92kr)   4752    5108    4465    6333    7396    9488
     AVERAGE SIZE            34     32      32      35      34      39
     SALES/TURNOVER (%)      90     96      92      90      92      95
     --------------------------------------------------------------------
     NOTE: 'SALES'=SALES OF PRODUCTS PRODUCES IN THE FIRM. 'TURNOVER'=SALES OF PRODUCTS 
     PRODUCES IN THE FIRM AS WELL AS SALES OF TRADED (UNMODIFIED) COMMODITIES, SERVICE
     AND REPAIRS, MOUNTING ETC. TURNOVER AND SALES GIVEN IN MILLION DANISH KRONER.
     SOURCE: STATISTICS DENMARK (DANMARKS STATISTIK) UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
 
                                    TABLE 3
               NEW FIRMS, CLOSURES & INCUMBENTS IN DENMARK 1972-92
                  INDUSTRY: WOODEN FURNITURE (ISIS(68) 33201)
                     (TURNOVER IN MILLIONS DANISH KRONER)
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
                        FIRMS           EMPLOYEES         TURNOVER     
                    -------------     -------------     -------------
                    1972     1992     1972     1992     1972     1992  
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       NEW             0      212        0     8035         0     5691
       CLOSED        224        0     6313        0      2427        0
       INCUMBENT     145      145     6215     6006      2826     4259
 
       TOTAL         369      357    12528    14041      5253     9950
       ----------------------------------------------------------------
       SOURCE: OWN ANALYSIS BASED ON UNPUBLISHED STATISTICAL MATERIAL
       FROM STATISTICS DENMARK (DANMARKS STATISTIK).
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